For over a century, Procter & Gamble (P&G) ruled the men’s grooming market with an iron blade. Its flagship brand, Gillette, was synonymous with shaving:
- Controlled ~70% of the global razor market by 2007
- Sold premium razors at $10–$25 apiece, with cartridge refills often locked behind glass at drugstores
- Spent hundreds of millions annually on endorsements, Super Bowl ads, and retail dominance
Gillette wasn’t just a product — it was a high-margin cash machine for P&G, part of a $15B grooming empire alongside Old Spice and Venus.
Then came Dollar Shave Club, and everything changed.
The $3 Video That Cut Deep
In March 2012, a little-known startup launched a video on YouTube titled:
“Our Blades Are F***ing Great.”
The ad starred Michael Dubin, co-founder of Dollar Shave Club (DSC), delivering one-liners while walking through a warehouse. The concept?
- $1/month for quality razors
- Delivered to your door
- No gimmicks, no retail markup, no complexity
The video went viral overnight:
- 4.75 million views in its first 3 months
- Crashed the company’s servers
- Generated 12,000 orders in 48 hours
Suddenly, a legacy industry was under attack — from a startup that didn’t make its own blades.
Dollar Shave Club’s Secret Weapon
DSC didn’t own factories. It partnered with Dorco, a South Korean blade manufacturer, and focused entirely on:
- Brand voice: Witty, irreverent, direct
- Subscription simplicity: No store visits, no upsells
- Data-driven personalization: Email cadence, upgrades, add-ons
- Content marketing: “Bathroom Minutes” email magazine, lifestyle-focused blog
- Millennial alignment: Anti-corporate tone, affordable luxury
Within 2 years:
- DSC had over 600,000 subscribers
- Grew to $60 million in revenue by 2014
- Expanded into shaving cream, wipes, hair gel, and skincare
It wasn’t just about razors — it was about disrupting how men bought personal care products.
Gillette’s (Delayed) Counterstrike
P&G didn’t panic immediately. It tried to ignore DSC as a niche.
But by 2016, subscription startups (including Harry’s) had taken 16% of the U.S. razor market. Gillette’s share dropped from ~70% to 59%.
Finally, P&G responded:
- Launched Gillette Shave Club
- Cut razor prices by up to 20% in 2017
- Sued DSC in 2015 for patent infringement (settled out of court)
- Released simplified product lines with fewer confusing options
- Tried to inject humor and authenticity into its brand voice
But by then, the story had changed. Gillette was reacting. DSC was leading.
The Unilever Surprise
In 2016, Unilever — P&G’s European arch-rival — made a surprise move:
It acquired Dollar Shave Club for $1 billion in cash.
Why?
- To build a U.S. male grooming presence
- To compete digitally and learn the DTC playbook
- To buy a brand with high lifetime value and media efficiency
- To challenge P&G head-on with a modern portfolio
Dubin stayed on as CEO, and DSC expanded into international markets, more personal care SKUs, and premium-tier blades.
Meanwhile, a New Challenger Emerged…
In 2013, Harry’s entered the scene — co-founded by Jeff Raider (ex-Warby Parker).
Unlike DSC, Harry’s:
- Manufactured its own blades (eventually acquiring a factory in Germany)
- Took a premium minimalist aesthetic
- Focused heavily on design, packaging, and retail presence
By 2019, Harry’s was set to be acquired by Edgewell (parent of Schick) for $1.37 billion — until the FTC blocked the deal on antitrust grounds.
That marked a new era: the FTC now saw razors as a critical consumer market.
Strategic Takeaway
✅ Disruption Isn’t Always Product — It’s Channel
DSC didn’t invent better razors. It invented a better way to buy them.
✅ Narrative > Muscle
Gillette had better blades. DSC had a better story. And story wins attention.
✅ Legacy Brands Can’t Be Lazy
P&G failed to anticipate the millennial shift toward DTC, simplicity, and irreverent brands.
❌ Too Late to Copy
By the time Gillette launched its own subscription, the cultural moment had passed.
The Numbers
| Year | Gillette U.S. Market Share | DSC Subscribers | DSC Revenue | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 70%+ | — | — | Pre-DSC era |
| 2014 | 62% | 600K+ | $60M+ | DSC goes mainstream |
| 2016 | 59% | 3M+ | $200M+ | Unilever acquisition |
| 2021 | 52% | ~4M | ~$250M est. | Competitive market |
The Lessons Learned
- Disruption starts small — DSC used a $4K video to rewrite a $10B market.
- Humor scales — when it’s authentic and well-timed, irreverent voice builds loyalty.
- Direct-to-consumer is power — especially when legacy players rely on third-party retailers.
- Even giants can bleed — when they’re slow to move and protected by assumptions.
The razor war wasn’t about blades.
It was about who controlled the conversation, the customer, and the channel.
And for a few years, a startup with a shipping label beat the king at his own game.
