Founded in 1971 in Springfield, New Jersey, Bed Bath & Beyond (BB&B) began as a humble home furnishings store called Bed ‘n Bath. Its premise was simple: provide an overwhelming selection of name-brand sheets, towels, and kitchenware at competitive prices — all under one roof.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, BB&B became a middle-class retail icon. Customers loved the experience:
- Endless aisles of products
- Trusted brands like Cuisinart, Dyson, and Calphalon
- Famous 20% off paper coupons that never expired
- A reputation for generous return policies and well-stocked stores
BB&B expanded aggressively:
- Acquired Christmas Tree Shops, buybuy BABY, and Cost Plus World Market
- Operated over 1,500 stores across North America
- Became a staple for wedding registries, college dorm shopping, and new homeowners
By 2013, the company was riding high:
- Annual revenue: $12 billion
- Net income: $1 billion
- Market cap: Over $17 billion
- Ranked among the top 10 U.S. retail chains
It was the kind of store you didn’t visit weekly — but when you needed something big, durable, or domestic, you always went to BB&B.
The Slow Unraveling
But behind the familiar blue signs, problems were brewing.
1️⃣ E-Commerce Blind Spot
As Amazon, Wayfair, and Walmart doubled down on online retail, BB&B remained stubbornly physical. Its e-commerce experience was outdated, clunky, and uninspiring.
2️⃣ Overreliance on Coupons
The brand had trained its customers to never pay full price. The iconic 20% off coupon became a crutch — and a margin killer.
3️⃣ Store Saturation
While competitors optimized for efficiency, BB&B continued expanding. Many stores were too large, too cluttered, and too expensive to maintain.
4️⃣ Operational Inefficiency
BB&B lacked centralized buying. Stores often stocked locally instead of strategically. Its supply chain lagged far behind retail peers.
The Leadership Shuffle
From 2015 onward, BB&B went through a series of executive shakeups:
- Longtime founders stepped down after investor pressure
- Activist investors pushed for modernization and cost cuts
- In 2019, Mark Tritton, former Target executive, became CEO and promised a “total transformation”
Tritton made bold moves:
- Closed 200+ stores
- Rolled out private-label brands
- Spent over $250 million to revamp stores
- Invested in digital, mobile, and curbside pickup
But his strategy backfired:
- Customers didn’t resonate with new in-house brands
- The inventory shift alienated loyal shoppers
- The pandemic scrambled supply chains and delayed execution
- Sales dropped further despite modernization
By 2022, the turnaround had stalled. Tritton was ousted. And the walls were closing in.
The Financial Collapse
Between 2014 and 2022:
- Annual revenue fell from $12B to $7.8B
- Net income turned into net losses
- Store count dropped from 1,500+ to ~600
- Market cap shrunk from $17B to under $500 million
Meanwhile, BB&B:
- Burned through over $11 billion in share buybacks between 2004 and 2017
- Took on $1.8 billion in debt
- Defaulted on vendor payments and rent obligations
In August 2022, BB&B became a meme stock, surging temporarily as Reddit retail traders jumped in. But the rally was short-lived.
In January 2023, the company warned it might not survive. By April, it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Liquidation
The bankruptcy marked the end of an era.
- All BB&B stores closed by summer 2023
- BuyBuy BABY was sold to Overstock.com (which rebranded its website to BedBathandBeyond.com)
- Thousands of employees were laid off
- Landlords reclaimed real estate across malls and retail centers
- Creditors began sorting through over $5.2 billion in liabilities
A brand that once dominated home goods retail was liquidated, with only its website and logo surviving in a different corporate shell.
Strategic Failures
❌ Late Digital Adoption
BB&B didn’t seriously invest in e-commerce until nearly 20 years after Amazon launched. By then, consumer behavior had changed.
❌ Misreading Customer Loyalty
Private-label strategy worked at Target — not at BB&B. Its customer base wanted brands they knew and coupons they trusted.
❌ Burned Cash, Not Debt
The company spent billions on buybacks during its peak years instead of modernizing its tech, stores, or logistics.
❌ No Brand Reinvention
While Target leaned into lifestyle and Walmart modernized logistics, BB&B tried to be the same store in a world that had changed.
The Numbers
| Year | Revenue | Store Count | Key Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | $12.1B | 1,533 | Peak revenue |
| 2019 | $11.2B | 1,020 | Tritton hired |
| 2022 | $7.8B | ~600 | Heavy losses |
| 2023 | ~$3.5B | 0 | Bankruptcy and liquidation |
The Lessons Learned
- Customer habits evolve — retail must too. BB&B treated Amazon as a threat too late.
- Coupon culture kills margin. Endless discounting builds expectation, not loyalty.
- Modernization can’t be surface-deep. Store revamps without core operational change are wasted spend.
- Use your peak wisely. BB&B’s billions in buybacks could’ve funded its survival — but they vanished into the market.
Bed Bath & Beyond was a brand people trusted.
But retail isn’t about nostalgia.
It’s about timing, tech, and transformation.
